Quantcast StorefrontBacktalk » Blog Archive » Who Really Pays For Weak Retail Security?
advertisement
advertisement

Who Really Pays For Weak Retail Security?

Written by Evan Schuman
February 22nd, 2007
Like this story? Share it
To share this story with people in your social network, please click on the network icons below.

As legislation moves through the Massachusetts legislature–and is threatened to be introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives–assigning responsibility for retailers if they have a data breach that is found to be their fault, former federal prosecutor Mark Rasch makes an interesting observation.

While the debate has focused attention on the banking lobby’s position that they foot the bill for the losses due to retail errors, he counters that, ironically, it ends up being the retailers–as a group–who pay for retail security violations.

No, we’re not talking about retailers having to pay higher card interchange rates to pay for the fraud. That’s true, but there’s a much more real cost. When a cyberthief steals data from TJX, that thief will quickly try and convert it into spending money, most likely via a fraudulent card-not-present purchase that is quickly converted into cash.

Those fraudulent purchases are usually made at retail locations. When those charges are reversed by the banks, it’s the retail victim that often ends up paying for that merchandise. If there was justice in the world, the thief who steals data from TJX would then make fraudulent purchases at TJX, but data thieves?who tend to have a poorly developed sense-of-the-ironic?often make their bad purchases anywhere but the retailer from whom they stole the data.

But wait, this gets even more perverse. If you take the scenario to the next logical step, it means that a TJX would indeed get punished when, let’s say, cyber thieves break into the databases of CircuitCity or RiteAid and then use that information to make fake purchases at Marshalls or TJ Maxx.

In an Orwellian twist, a retailer would fare best by comparison as long as every other retailer has a better security setup. Talk about retailers having to pay for the sins of their brothers.


advertisement

One Comment | Read Who Really Pays For Weak Retail Security?

  1. Drew Says:

    If we’re talking about who ultimately pays more it’s obviously the consumer. Regardless of any legislation the consumer is at the bottom of this feeding chain.

    When banks are held liable then it’s the consumer that pays more in fees and through reduced margins on interest rates.

    When retailers are held liable then it’s the consumer that absorbs higher prices as a result of litigation, penalties or (as described in this article) credit card fraud.

    A valid point is made with respect to the irony of retailers that are “punished” by their peers’ security breaches but I believe it’s important to remember that it is consumers that ultimately foot the bill.

Leave a Reply

Newsletter

Quickly catch-up on the latest in E-Commerce and Retail Tech with our free weekly newsletter, with urgent bulletins as news merits.
advertisement

Most Recent Comments

Kill All The Passwords

This article does mention, but does not give enough attention to, the fact that the attacks discussed are only feasible when the encrypted password file can be copied and subjected to an offline attack. The trick is to have authentication performed on a separate, much more strongly secured host - such as an Active Directory Domain Controller, or a Kerberos server, or a NIS+ server, or even using something as banal as an LDAP-over-SSL authentication dialog. In these environments, the odds of the "password file" being stolen and subjected to an offline attack go to near zero, and only online attacks may be carried out by the attacker. With sensible exponential backoff between failed password attempts, lockout after a modest number of failed attempts on a single account, and pattern detection, that minimum 7 character password is quite secure enough. Passwords aren't dead yet for security purposes, and they will be with us for a very long while to come for practical purposes. The trick is to employ them correctly. Read more...
The possibilities you describe are years away from being implemented at best, so for the moment passwords are an ugly reality. Luckily, password managers can easily manage hundreds of passwords of any length. The only thing a user needs to remember is the master password. It seems like an easier task to educate users on how to use password managers rather than implement complex security technology on a global basis. Read more...